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Abstract
The ongoing, fluid nature of the COVID-19 pandemic re-
quires individuals to regularly seek information about best
health practices, local community spreading, and public
health guidelines. In the absence of a unified response to the
pandemic in the United States and clear, consistent directives
from federal and local officials, people have used social me-
dia to collectively crowdsource COVID-19 elites, a small set
of trusted COVID-19 information sources. We take a cen-
sus of COVID-19 crowdsourced elites in the United States
who have received sustained attention on Twitter during the
pandemic. Using a mixed methods approach with a panel of
Twitter users linked to public U.S. voter registration records,
we find that journalists, media outlets, and political accounts
have been consistently amplified around COVID-19, while
epidemiologists, public health officials, and medical profes-
sionals make up only a small portion of all COVID-19 elites
on Twitter. We show that COVID-19 elites vary considerably
across demographic groups, and that there are notable racial,
geographic, and political similarities and disparities between
various groups and the demographics of their elites. With this
variation in mind, we discuss the potential for using the dis-
proportionate online voice of crowdsourced COVID-19 elites
to equitably promote timely public health information and
mitigate rampant misinformation.
1 Introduction
Local COVID-19 caseloads, community guidelines, na-
tional directives, international travel bans, testing locations,
economic assistance, and scientific knowledge all change
rapidly, sometimes on a daily or even hourly basis, as we
learn more about COVID-19 as a disease and weather the
pandemic. The fluidity of the ongoing public health crisis
makes it difficult for individuals to find reliable informa-
tion online, forcing them to sift through both high-quality
expert information and life-threatening misinformation, par-
ticularly on social media platforms. As people individually
engage with an imperfect assortment of local news media,
epidemiological specialists, political pundits, public health
officials, and financially-motivated hoaxes online, users col-
lectively amplify a small set of disproportionately influential
COVID-19 information sources. These accounts are key pil-
lars in the online information ecosystem because they are the
most capable of disseminating both critical health informa-
tion and divisive anti-scientific opinions. Yet, despite their
importance, we do not currently know who people have been
consistently consulting on social media for information re-
garding the pandemic.
Here, we identify sustained sources of COVID-19 infor-
mation in the United States on Twitter, a key vessel of in-
formation for citizens, journalists, and politicians alike. We
draw on the concept of crowdsourced elites (Papacharissi
and de Fatima Oliveira 2012) to identify crowdsourced
COVID-19 elites, Twitter accounts that are collectively
deemed important sources of COVID-19 information. We
introduce a measure that identifies sustained crowdsourced
elites that are consistently amplified, and filters them from
one-off viral accounts and those who do not consistently
post about the pandemic. Using a panel of Twitter users
matched to public U.S. voter registration files, we apply
our measure of sustained amplification to enumerate crowd-
sourced COVID-19 elites, both nationally and across differ-
ent demographic, geographic, and ideological subgroups of
Twitter users in the United States. Nationally, we find that
journalists, media outlets, and political accounts are most of-
ten crowdsourced as COVID-19 information sources, while
epidemiologists, public health, and medical professionals
make up only a small portion of all COVID-19 elites. As
we show though, there is considerable variation in COVID-
19 elites across demographics, which accentuates racial, po-
litical, and geographic homophily and disparities between
COVID-19 elites and different subgroups. We discuss the
implications of these patterns for leveraging crowdsourced
COVID-19 elites to rapidly disseminate high-quality public
health information, particularly among marginalized popu-
lations that are most devastated by COVID-19, so that we
may counter hazardous misinformation online and mitigate
the pandemic offline.
2 Related Work
Networked Gatekeeping and Crowdsourced Elites
The synergistic mix of journalists, media outlets, celebrities,
and everyday people on Twitter gives the platform tremen-
dous potential for disseminating information. In particular,
Twitter has been critical during breaking news events (Hu et
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al. 2012) and rapidly changing situations where traditional
broadcast media outlets are not able to quickly adapt and
provide fully-fledged reports (Grusin 2010), such as social
protests (Jackson, Bailey, and Welles 2020) and natural dis-
asters (Pourebrahim et al. 2019). The fast pace of informa-
tion on the platform makes it a timely, constantly updating
alternative to mainstream media when they do not have on-
the-ground or authoritative information (Grusin 2010), or
when they are blocked, restricted, or otherwise not trusted
(Howard 2010; Papacharissi 2009). The COVID-19 pan-
demic lies at the intersection of the reasons people seek in-
formation on Twitter. The uniqueness of the pandemic as
a series of ongoing and constantly evolving public health
crises, together with the absence of unanimous, authoritative
guidance from federal and local health officials in the United
States, sharp polarization in communication of elected offi-
cials (Green et al. 2020), and historically low trust in tra-
ditional media (Fink 2019), has created confusion and dis-
trust, prompting many to turn to social media for up-to-date,
localized, and preferred COVID-19 information (Fisher and
Weiner 2020). Although it is possible to find reliable health
information, local directives, and other COVID-19 news on
social media, the information is generally variable in qual-
ity, and can lead people to erroneous conclusions that are not
grounded in any scientific facts about the virus (Fisher and
Weiner 2020).
The specific COVID-19 information sources that people
find online are curated through a collective, networked pro-
cess. While in traditional news media journalists perform
the function of gatekeeping, the process of selecting and
verifying news information (Shoemaker and Vos 2009), so-
cial media shifts the balance of power in shaping news pro-
duction (Chadwick 2011) and gives ordinary citizens the
means to curate news (Schonfeld 2010). Individuals and au-
diences are able to amplify particular pieces of content and
not others (Meraz 2009), allowing them to act as gatekeep-
ers on social networking sites. Through networked gatekeep-
ing, social media users collectively crowdsource informa-
tion sources to prominence by horizontally filtering and pro-
moting relevant content amongst each another (Papacharissi
and de Fatima Oliveira 2012; Meraz and Papacharissi 2013).
While many of these crowdsourced elites can often match
traditional elites (Hindman 2008), the particular affordances
of Twitter allow for more permeability in who is “elite,
compared with traditional media, and even older internet
platforms. Specifically, during acute and rapidly evolving
crises without authoritative information, local experts, ac-
tivists, and otherwise ordinary individuals often emerge as
crowdsourced elites (Jackson and Foucault Welles 2016;
Pourebrahim et al. 2019). Their local, technical, and situa-
tional knowledge is amplified through the networked gate-
keeping process, putting them alongside traditional elites,
like broadcast media and elected officials.
Sustained Crowdsourced Elites Across
Communities
Social media users invoke the networked gatekeeping pro-
cess by sharing and amplifying accounts they see as relevant
voices. In practice then, when the context is Twitter, crowd-
sourced elites are often identified by tallying the accounts
with the most retweets (Meraz and Papacharissi 2013; Jack-
son and Foucault Welles 2016; Stewart et al. 2017). This
is an effective proxy for measuring which accounts were
most visible, particularly during crises that emerge and dis-
sipate relatively quickly. However, focusing only on retweet
counts as a measure of the crowdsourcing mechanisms can
be misleading in the context of a sustained crisis like the
COVID-19 pandemic, a situation where constant engage-
ment with the issue over several months or more is impor-
tant. As a metric, the total number of reshares across all of
an accounts posts conflates three types of accounts: those
that had one viral post, those that had many low engagement
posts, and those that consistently had a variety of their posts
shared. Given that the pandemic is an ongoing crisis, it is
critical to be able to distinguish crowdsourced COVID-19
elites that are consistently amplified from those that inter-
mittently have their voice raised through viral posts but then
just as quickly recede.
More generally though, constructing a single ranked list
of crowdsourced elites according to any metric does not ac-
count for the ways in which different communities crowd-
source different elites. This is particularly important because
networked gatekeeping is susceptible to homophily effects,
the tendency for individuals to interact with those similar
to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001;
Wu et al. 2011). This can lead to a balkanization of infor-
mation, where different subgroups collectively amplify very
different information sources and crowdsource very differ-
ent elites (Conover et al. 2011; Foucault Welles and Jack-
son 2019). On its own, this is not necessarily a bad thing,
but, methodologically, if we only produce a single, over-
all ranking of crowdsourced elites and do not account for
homophilous groups, then we may overestimate the impor-
tance of general elites for key demographic, geographic,
and ideological communities; or, alternatively, we may un-
derestimate the importance of community-specific elites for
their particular constituencies. Research has consistently
shown that behavioral change campaigns—including those
designed to spread accurate information about things like
health risks, treatment, and vaccination—are considerably
more effective when trusted opinion leaders are enlisted to
encourage their adoption and compliance (Valente and Davis
1999; Xu et al. 2014). Given that networked gatekeeping in-
herently results in the accounts that are collectively trusted
to provide information, these community-specific crowd-
sourced elites may be able to trigger larger informational
cascades (Cha et al. 2010) and reach more people with criti-
cal public health information.
3 Data and Methods
We use a mixed methods approach for identifying the sus-
tained amplification of COVID-19 elites during the first
three months of the pandemic in the United States. We draw
on a panel of Twitter users matched to public U.S. voting
registration records, and identify COVID-19 content through
a keywords-based approach. We then introduce a measure
of sustained amplification, and rank accounts retweeted by
our panel according to their consistent presence in COVID-
19 discussions. Having identified COVID-19 crowdsourced
elites across a number of demographics, we undertake a
qualitative hand coding process and annotate them accord-
ing to their type of account, race, gender, political affiliation,
and geographic locality. We use those labeled accounts to
map who people have been amplifying during the pandemic,
and compare differences in crowdsourced elites across de-
mographics.
Twitter Panel of Registered Voters
To focus our analysis on American Twitter users and how
they amplify COVID-19 content, we use a panel of Twitter
users linked with public U.S. voter registration records. The
panel, developed in prior work (Grinberg et al. 2019), was
constructed by first starting with a 10% sample of tweets
collected from the Twitter Decahose. From this sample, ac-
counts were extracted if they reported a U.S. location in their
profile and included a full name in their account or handle.
These accounts were then joined with public voter registra-
tion files—assembled by the data vendor TargetSmart—by
matching unique entries according to both name and loca-
tion. For example, if Jane Doe was the only one with her
name in Boston, Massachusetts, then her account was linked
to the corresponding entry in the voter file. On the other
hand, if there were multiple individuals with the name John
Doe in Boston, none of them were included. In total, the
matching process resulted in a Twitter panel of about 1.5
million registered U.S. voters, estimated to be about 3% of
all adult Twitter users in the U.S (Perrinn and Anderson
2019).
Using the panel of Twitter users matched to U.S. voter
registration records has several benefits over other method-
ological approaches. First, we can be quite confident that
we are studying the online behavior of real people, and not
that of media outlets, organizations, social bots, and other
non-human entities (Ferrara et al. 2016; Gorwa and Guil-
beault 2020). Second, as we describe momentarily, the panel
makes it possible to study demographic variation in Twitter
behavior, which is not otherwise possible using the Twitter
API because Twitter does not solicit that information from
its users. Finally, the size of the panel allows us to focus
our analyses on demographic minorities and other marginal-
ized populations while retaining a statistically reliable sam-
ple size (Foucault Welles 2014).
We make use of several demographic attributes from the
panel data: state, race, gender, age, and political affiliation.
The state of residence, age, and gender of our panel mem-
bers come directly from the voter registration records. For
race, only the nine states required by the Voting Rights Act
consistently report race through voter registration records.
For the remaining states, we use race as inferred by TargetS-
mart, who use a model based on the statistical distinctive-
ness of voters names with respect to their domicile in the
United States. We recognize this is an imperfect measure,
both statistically and ethically, though in aggregate the panel
racial demographics tend to be consistent with survey esti-
mates of Twitter demographics in the United States (Grin-
berg et al. 2019). For party affiliation, we use TargetSmarts
estimate of party score, which is a statistical estimate based
on a number of variables, including, for example, registered
political party, number of votes in Republican and Demo-
crat primaries, and FEC contributions. The score, which is
more consistent across states then mere party registration,
falls within an interval from 0 to 100, indicating the proba-
bility that a registered voter supports the Democratic party.
Following TargetSmarts recommended guidance, we clas-
sify any individual with a score less than 35 as a Republican
and more than 65 as a Democrat.
Ethically, the linking of Twitter data to voter registra-
tion records warrants some concern. While we use pub-
lic U.S. voter registration records and names and locations
that were clearly and publicly disclosed on Twitter, many
Twitter users likely do not anticipate having their informa-
tion linked across these datasets (Fiesler and Proferes 2018;
Sloan et al. 2020) and their explicit consent was not ob-
tained to do so. To defend against misuse of the data and any
harm that may come to panel members from linking their
Twitter profiles to their voter registration records, we store
and analyze all data on secure servers with multiple check-
points of restricted access. In addition, we do not include any
private accounts in our analyses, and only report aggregate
trends across the panel. Finally, the construction and use of
the Twitter panel was approved by our Institutional Review
Board. We believe these safeguards significantly mitigate the
potential risks of linking the data. Given our goal of iden-
tifying critical information sources among Americans dur-
ing the unprecedented public health crisis of the COVID-
19 pandemic, particularly so that we may more equitably
ensure minorities and marginalized populations have access
to high-quality information, and that we implemented strict
protections so that the linked data will not be abused, we be-
lieve that using the Twitter panel as we do here is warranted
and ethically justified.
COVID-19 Tweet Identification
Using the Twitter panel as our source of tweets, we iden-
tify COVID-19-related content through a keyword-based ap-
proach. We compiled a multilingual keyword list starting
from three sources: the keyword list for the COVID-19 Twit-
ter Dataset assembled by Chen, Lerman, and Ferrara (2020),
the keyword list from Green et. als study on elite polar-
ization around COVID-19 (2020), and the keyword filters
for Twitters official COVID-19 streaming endpoint as of
May 13th, 2020.1 We then augmented those lists with addi-
tional terms to expand their coverage across COVID-19 re-
lated topics and misinformation, and removed select words
from the lists that were likely to produce false positives (e.g.
“china). In total, our list consists of 909 keywords, includ-
ing, for example, terms explicitly mentioning the pandemic
(“covid-19, “coronavirus), phrases referencing societal re-
sponses (“social distancing, “flatten the curve, “stayathome-
challenge), names for different types of masks (“n95, “surgi-
cal mask, “face covering), and hashtags associated with mis-
information (“plandemic, “faucifraud, “arrestbillgates2020).
1https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/labs/covid19-
stream/filtering-rules
The full keyword list will be available as an online supple-
ment.
We searched for these keywords in every tweet posted by
our panel members from January 1st, 2020 to June 1st, 2020.
We labeled a tweet as COVID-related if at least one key-
word matched the tweet text, including any quoted text, any
hashtags, or any substring of any URL included in the tweet.
Finally, we identified COVID-related URLs and expanded
our final tweet dataset to include any tweet using at least
one of those URLs. A URL was identified as being COVID-
related, even if it did not contain any keywords itself, if it
was used with our keywords at least 100 times and at least
20% of its use was with COVID keywords. Upon manual in-
spection, we found that these two filters identified a number
of COVID-related URLs that were not otherwise labeled as
such, while returning a minimal number of false positives.
Overall, our tweet collection strategy resulted in 19,964,955
tweets posted by 483,683 panel members, where 14,233,300
of those tweets are retweets. Over 96% of the tweets were
posted after March 1st, 2020, when COVID-19 first became
a focal point of conversation in the United States. The small
proportion of tweets identified prior to the pandemic sug-
gests that our keyword list has a generally low false positive
rate.
Sustained Amplification
Shares, and retweets on Twitter specifically, are a canon-
ical measure of amplification on social media platforms.
During emergent discussions that rapidly coalesce around
particular offline events, hashtags, and news stories (Meraz
and Papacharissi 2013; Jackson and Foucault Welles 2016;
Stewart et al. 2017), counting the total number of retweets
that different accounts received is often an effective way
of identifying crowdsourced elites, those who commanded
the most attention in the online conversation. However, the
count of retweets is not necessarily a measure of consistent
amplification, particularly during an extended and ongoing
crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. If we are interested
in who is receiving sustained attention online during the
pandemic, only counting retweets risks over-representing
users who had a small number of very popular tweets about
COVID-19, but who were otherwise not at the backbone of
COVID-19 conversations, and those who authored a very
large number of tweets, but who received very few inter-
actions on any one of them.
To balance between these extremes and identify sustained
amplification around COVID-19, we define a COVID-19
retweet h-index. The h-index, originally proposed for mea-
suring academic citations (Hirsch 2005), assigns an index of
h to a user if that user has at least h COVID-related tweets
which have h retweets each. For example, a user with 20
COVID-related tweets that each have at least 20 retweets
will have an h-index of 20, while a user with either a single
viral tweet or many tweets each with only 1 retweet will only
have an h-index of 1. This means that a user can only have
a high COVID-19 h-index if they consistently contribute to
COVID-19 conversations and and receive attention for those
contributions. The COVID-19 retweet h-index refines our
typical measure of amplification so that it accounts for sus-
tained voice over the course of a prolonged crisis.
COVID-19 Crowdsourced Elites
For every account retweeted by one of our Twitter panel
members, we calculate both the total number of COVID-
19 related retweets received by the panel and their COVID-
19 h-index. We then rank all the accounts by each of these
measures, yielding two ranked lists from which we extract
the top 0.1% of accounts. We do this both across the entire
national panel and for each demographic of age, race, gen-
der, state of residence, and political affiliation. For exam-
ple, we identify the COVID-19 elites crowdsourced by resi-
dents of Massachusetts by calculating the h-index according
to retweets from just panel members in Massachusetts. For
demographics where the top 0.1% resulted in less than 50
accounts, we include all 50 of the top accounts, beyond just
the top 0.1%. Across both rankings of retweets and h-index
and all demographics, this ranking and aggregation process
yielded 1,478 unique accounts: 1,245 accounts are crowd-
sourced elites according to total retweets, and 1,098 are sus-
tained crowdsourced elites according to the h-index.
To compare COVID-19 crowdsourced elites across differ-
ent measures of amplification and demographics, we then
conducted a qualitative analysis to characterize them. We
first devised a classification scheme of potential COVID-19
information sources: public health officials, medical profes-
sionals, epidemiologists, other public intellectuals, elected
officials, public services (police, city offices, etc.), other po-
litical accounts, media outlets, journalists, religious leaders,
entertainers, athletes, other organizations, other accounts,
and accounts that do not exist anymore. We formalized this
typology in a codebook that also specified codes and instruc-
tions for attributing demographic and professional informa-
tion to the crowdsourced elites, including their gender, race,
political affiliation, and geographic locality. Three authors
and five research assistants were trained on the codebook
and instructed to use publicly-available information to re-
search the COVID-19 crowdsourced elites, identify the rel-
evant attributes, and classify them according to the infor-
mation source typology. The codebook was updated itera-
tively based on feedback from the coding team, and all data
were re-coded following codebook updates. Any ambiguous
cases, as well as all cases marked “other were reviewed by
at least two coders prior to finalizing a code. Average pair-
wise agreement across all coders calculated on a 5% sam-
ple of the data at the conclusion of coding ranged from 85%
on codes with more categories (geographic location, account
type) to over 90% on codes with fewer categories (gender,
race, political ideology). The lowest pairwise agreement (ac-
count type) was 85.714% and the highest pairwise agree-
ment (gender) was 97.143%.
4 Results
Sustained Amplification of COVID-19 Elites
We first show that sustained amplification differs from raw
amplification, as measured through total shares, and that raw
amplification consistently overranks viral accounts relative
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Figure 1: A) The distribution of COVID-19 crowdsourced elite account types, according to elites identified by counting total
retweets (red) and calculating their retweet h-index (blue, see Data and Methods for details). B) Comparisons of accounts when
ranking by their total number of retweets and h-index. Accounts above the line of equality in red are ranked higher by their
total number of retweets, while accounts below the line of equality in blue are ranked higher by their h-index. C) Percent
contribution of each type of elite account to the overall rank divergence (Dodds et al. 2020). All contributions are positive, but
bars are directed according to whether the average rank of accounts of a particular type are higher according to total retweets
(red, to the right) or h-index (blue, to the left). The annotations next to each bar show the average h-index rank (left) versus the
average total retweets rank (right).
to elites that consistently makeup the backbone of COVID-
19 conversations. Using retweets from our national Twitter
panel, we rank accounts according to both the total number
of retweets they received on COVID-19 content and their
COVID-19 retweet h-index (see Data and Methods for de-
tails). We take the top 0.1% of both rankings as the crowd-
sourced elites, resulting in 813 elites for each ranking. All
together, this yields 949 unique national elites, where 677 of
them (83.3%) are shared between the two rankings. Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump is ranked first according to both his
total retweets and h-index (nRT = 92, 536, h = 204), fol-
lowed by former vice president and current presidential can-
didate Joe Biden (nRT = 84, 485, h = 171). The average
elite ranked by their h-index received 6,869 retweets and
had an h-index of 32, while the average elite ranked by their
total retweets received 7,087 retweets and had an h-index of
30.
In Figure 1A, we show the distribution of account types
among both the retweet and h-index rankings, as identified
by our hand labeling. Regardless of the ranking, we see clear
trends in what types of accounts have been amplified around
COVID-19. Journalists and media outlets command a sig-
nificant portion of the COVID-19 discussion, followed by
political accounts on both the left and right. Notably across
both rankings, medical professionals, public health officials,
and epidemiologists make up only a small portion of all
crowdsourced elites (about 3%). Overall, online discussions
of COVID-19 in the United States have been led by journal-
istic media and assorted political accounts, with less center-
ing of accounts that may have more technical and frontline
knowledge.
Compared to the retweet h-index, which accounts for
the sustained nature of the pandemic, raw totals of
retweets overestimate the prevalence of media outlets among
COVID-19 elites, and underestimate the prevalence of jour-
nalists. Total retweets also overestimate the number of elites
that are political accounts on the left, underestimate the con-
sistency of attention given to right-wing political accounts
and, to a lesser extent, underestimate the sustained amplifi-
cation of elected Democratic officials. Further though, the
total retweets and h-index not only estimate different preva-
lences for these accounts, but rank them differently as well.
In Figure 1B, we compare the relative rank of each crowd-
sourced elite according to their total retweets and h-index.
A number of the plots, including those for journalists, media
outlets, left-wing and right-wing political accounts, public
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intellectuals, and entertainers exhibit a red banding effect to
the left, which indicates accounts that have high rank ac-
cording to total retweets, but low rank according to h-index.
These are the accounts that are particularly over ranked by
only counting retweets: they may have a few tweets that gar-
nered many retweets, but they do not consistently contribute
to the COVID-19 discourse.
We quantify these overrankings more precisely using the
rank divergence (Dodds et al. 2020). The rank divergence
measures how differently the total retweets and h-index rank
each account while, unlike other rank correlation measures,
accounting for whether those shifts are across high, impor-
tant ranks or lower, more peripheral ranks. The individual
rank divergences are then aggregated together into the to-
tal rank divergence of each account type. We display these
aggregate divergences in Figure 1, and annotate them with
the average h-index and total retweet ranks of all accounts
in each class. Both the rank divergences and differences in
average ranks show how momentarily popular accounts can
skew our understanding of who has been consistently crowd-
sourced as an elite during the pandemic. For example, the
three panels of Figure 1 together indicate that the prevalence
of politically left accounts among COVID-19 elites is over-
estimated exactly because total retweets overweight the im-
portance of one-off viral accounts that do not receive sus-
tained amplification. Overall, journalists and media outlets
contribute the most to the divergence between the retweet
and h-index rankings, partly because of how they rank the
accounts differently, but also because of the abundance of
those types of accounts. On the other hand, while medical
professionals and public health officials have significant dif-
ferences in their average ranks between the two rankings
(see annotations of Figure 1C), there are significantly fewer
of these accounts, and so their overall contribution to the
rank divergence is much lower. In addition to overranking
most account types because of viral outliers, total retweets
also underrank the extent to which elected officials, both
Republican and Democrat, have been consistently amplified
around COVID-19.
Demographic Crowdsourcing of COVID-19 Elites
Having demonstrated our measure of sustained amplifica-
tion, we now map the variation of COVID-19 elites among
different demographic audiences. For each demographic of
race, gender, age, state, and political affiliation in our Twitter
panel, we calculate the COVID-19 retweet h-index for each
account retweeted only by that demographic, and rank them
accordingly. From those rankings we take the top 0.1% of
accounts to be the demographics COVID-19 crowdsourced
elites. For demographics where the top 0.1% of accounts
yielded less than 50 total accounts, we took the top 50 rather
than the top 0.1%. We then compare the COVID-19 elites
of each demographic to the national elites, those with the
highest h-indices according to all retweets from members of
our Twitter panel. There are 1,040 unique elites across all
demographics, where 756 of those elites (72%) are shared
with the 813 national elites.
We first examine to what extent different demographic
communities crowdsource elites from that community. For
example, we measure what proportion of COVID-19 elites
amplified by Republicans are themselves either Republican
elected officials or right-wing political accounts, or what
proportion of COVID-19 elites amplified by Black citizens
are Black. We compare these to the same values calculated
for the national panel, i.e. we compare the proportion of
Black elites among Black panel members to the proportion
of Black elites among the panel as a whole. The results
across lines of political affiliation are shown in Figure 2A,
and the results across lines of race are shown in Figure 2B.
We did not find any preferential amplification of elites with
respect to gender.
With respect to party, we find that both Democrats and
Republicans respectively amplify more left and right wing
COVID-19 elites than done so nationally. When looking
specifically at political COVID-19 elites (those labeled as
elected officials or otherwise political), rather than all elite
account types, 82% of Democrats political elites are left
wing, and 73.9% of Republicans political elites are right
wing (compared to 58.8% and 41.2% respectively among
national political elites). With respect to race, we find that
people of color are more likely to have COVID-19 elites
that align with their racial demographic, compared to the
national elites. Black panel members in particular have sig-
nificantly more Black COVID-19 elites than the panel as
a whole: while only about 8% of COVID-19 elites nation-
ally are Black, 23% of COVID-19 accounts amplified by
Black users are themselves Black. While the absolute num-
ber of Latinx/Hispanic and Asian COVID-19 elites is lower
both nationally and for each demographic, Latinx/Hispanic
panel members are about three times more likely to have a
Latinx/Hispanic person among their elites, and Asian panel
members are about 1.5 times more likely to crowdsource
an Asian person as an elite. Generally, people of color are
more likely to have COVID-19 elites that are of color: when
looking at accounts that have a race (as opposed to orga-
nizations, for example), it is 71% more likely for the elites
of Black panel members to be non-white compared to those
of white panel members, and 21% and 12% more likely for
the elites of Latinx/Hispanic and Asian panel members to be
non-white, respectively.
For each state, we find that there are relatively more local
COVID-19 elites among the states elites than there are na-
tionally. Figure 2C shows the difference in percentage points
between the percent of a states elites that are local journal-
ists, media outlets, and elected officials and the percent of
all national elites that are from that same state. The aver-
age state has 7.5 percentage points more local representation
than is seen nationally, where 29 states have no local repre-
sentation at all among national COVID-19 elites. Even states
that are already highly represented among national elites, in-
cluding California (2.5% of all national elites) and New York
(1.9% of all national elites), crowdsource relatively more lo-
cal elites: 4.5% of all Californian elites and 3.3% of all New
York elites are affiliated with California and New York re-
spectively.
Finally, for each demographic, we look at the distribution
of account types that they have crowdsourced as COVID-
19 elites, shown in Figure 2D. Consistent with the aggre-
gate national results of Figure 1A, we see that all demo-
graphics have consistently amplified journalists for COVID-
19 information. Also consistent with the national trends, all
demographics have crowdsourced very few medical profes-
sionals, public health officials, and epidemiologists as their
COVID-19 experts. There are varying trends around po-
litical accounts for different demographics. As mentioned,
Democrats and Republicans amplify more left- and right-
wing accounts as their elites respectively. By the account
type breakdown though, we see that both political demo-
graphics, and especially Republicans, crowdsource rela-
tively more assorted political accounts than elected officials.
Non-white panel members crowdsource very few right-wing
elites, and place particular emphasis on the accounts of
elected Democratic officials, rather than just general left-
wing accounts. Political accounts of all types are crowd-
sourced more as elites among higher age bins: 29% of elites
for panel members ages 18-29 are political, 36% are for
those ages 30-49, 44% are for those ages 50-64, and almost
50% are for those ages 65 and older. In contrast to this trend,
14% of elites for those ages 18-29 are media outlets, while
that number falls for those ages 30-49 (8%), 50-64 (6%), and
older (3%).
5 Discussion
Scientific Expertise and COVID-19 Elites
In this paper, we have taken a census of who Americans
consistently turn to for COVID-19 information on Twit-
ter, and how those information sources vary across demo-
graphic groups. We introduced a measure of sustained am-
plification, which consistently identifies and ranks who lies
at the backbone of COVID-19 discussions online. Apply-
ing this measure to a panel of American Twitter users, we
documented that people have primarily amplified journal-
ists and media outlets as COVID-19 elites, followed by
assorted political accounts across the political spectrum.
Further, we have also shown that epidemiologists, public
health officials, and medical professionals only make up
a small fraction of all COVID-19 elites crowdsourced na-
tionally and across demographics. Consistent with other
work on COVID-19 discussions online (Green et al. 2020;
Jiang et al. 2020), these results indicate that Americans are
receiving a sizeable portion of their COVID-19 informa-
tion from political sources, including elected officials and
political pundits, which likely results from and contributes
to a polarized information ecosystem in the United States
and politicizes the pandemic. Moreover, even sources that
are not expressly political, such as mainstream journalists,
may be perceived to be political by those with strong par-
tisan affiliations, further exacerbating the politicization of
COVID-19 information (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). Scientists
and medical professionals, the most widely trusted sources
across the political spectrum (Funk, Kennedy, and Johnson
2020), are scarcely present among the elites discovered in
our analysis. While some prior work has estimated that sci-
entific experts and authorities have made up a notable por-
tion of COVID-19 discussions (Gligoric´ et al. 2020), our re-
sults here suggest that those individuals are not consistently
leaders in spreading COVID-19 information.
While our measure of sustained amplification can identify
accounts that are persistently referred to for COVID-19 in-
formation, there are still a number of factors it cannot disen-
tangle. Evidence suggests that the U.S. public, across demo-
graphic and ideological lines, trusts medical professionals
and scientists more than elected officials and journalists, and
this trust is on the rise since the start of the pandemic (Funk,
Kennedy, and Johnson 2020). Yet, our results suggest sci-
entists and medical professionals are not playing a central
role in driving conversations about COVID-19 on Twitter,
relative to other groups. This research cannot say exactly
why this is the case; it may be that epidemiologists, public
health officials, and medical professionals do not have estab-
lished followings to amplify their messages, their messaging
itself is ineffective, or they do not post about the pandemic
as much as other types of accounts. All of these explanations
suggest different interventions: the information of scientists
and public authorities may need to be amplified further, their
public communication needs to be improved, or they need
to engage with the public more on Twitter generally. Re-
gardless, given that all of the major social media platforms
made a statement in March 2020 that they were elevating
authoritative content on their platforms in response to the
pandemic (Shu and Shieber 2020), and that a number of po-
litical, entertainment, and other public intellectuals have had
significant voice in COVID-19 discussions, it is concerning
that epidemiological experts and public health authorities
are not more prominent among crowdsourced COVID-19
elites. This suggests that social media platforms may need
to go further to ensure that experts are regularly centered in
COVID-19 discussions and their messages well received.
Marginality and Misinformation
If the relevant scientific and public authorities are not reg-
ularly consulted for COVID-19 information, then effec-
tive public health messaging interventions should focus on
crowdsourced COVID-19 elites who already share a sus-
tained portion of COVID-19 discussions online. Impor-
tantly, we show that these elites vary notably across demo-
graphic groups, and that across lines of race, geography, and
political affiliation, people are more likely to amplify ac-
counts that are relevant to their beliefs and background. In
particular, we showed that people of color were more likely
to share COVID-19 information from elites of color. Peo-
ple of color are disproportionately affected by the pandemic
(Wrigley-Field 2020; Azar et al. 2020), and our results sug-
gest that there is a need for more non-white experts and
authorities to communicate with these marginalized popu-
lations. Scientific experts and public officials could, for ex-
ample, engage minority and local elites to transmit reliable
information about COVID-19 to their respective communi-
ties online. While these steps will not solve offline racial
inequities regarding COVID-19, they may help mitigate
them to some extent, especially if crowdsourced elites can
be used to combat misinformation targeting these groups.
Given that the United States atrocious scientific track record
of unethically experimenting on people of color, and Black
people specifically, has undermined their trust in American
health officials and scientific experts, these populations are
primed for particular types of COVID-19 misinformation
that can have fatal outcomes (Collins-Dexter 2020). Lever-
aging COVID-19 crowdsourced elites to communicate pub-
lic health messaging to these marginalized communities may
be a critical component in combating these kinds of misin-
formation.
Furthermore, while our current analysis highlights the
types of people and accounts who have been sustained
crowdsourced elites during the COVID-19 pandemic, we
have not yet looked at the quality of the information be-
ing shared by these accounts. In itself, it is not necessarily
concerning that content from journalists and media outlets
are elevated significantly more than content from epidemi-
ologists, public health officials, and medical professionals.
Indeed, if the latter do not already have an established so-
cial media following, they may need media platforms to
make their expertise visible through more traditional means
then retweets. However, media outlets vary widely in their
commitment and ability to sharing high-quality, accurate
information, and the World Health Organization and other
experts have warned of an “infodemic which has plagued
the COVID-19 pandemic (W.H.O. 2020; Donovan 2020;
Gallotti et al. 2020). Previous work has further found notable
partisan and age differences in fake news sharing (Grinberg
et al. 2019), suggesting that we may see partisan differences
in the quality of content shared by party-sourced elites here.
In future work, we plan to evaluate the quality of informa-
tion shared by elites, with a particular focus on the amplifi-
cation of misinformation and information pollution. We will
also look more closely at the content being shared by local
health departments and public officials, assessing the degree
to which this content reflects the most accurate information
that was available at the time it was shared.
Limitations
We acknowledge that there are limitations to our study. With
respect to our Twitter panel itself, we have used black-
box inferences of race and political affiliation provided
by a data vendor. While addressing biases in these infer-
ences is beyond the scope of the current work, it is impor-
tant for future work to continue mapping COVID-19 elites
among these demographics so that we may better under-
stand where our estimates here are problematic. With respect
to COVID-19 elites, we only label a small portion of all
users retweeted by our panel members, the top 0.1%. This
may partly explain why epidemiologists, public health offi-
cials, and medical professionals do not appear highly among
crowdsourced COVID-19 elites. With respect to information
seeking behavior, we cannot say to what extent COVID-19
crowdsourced elites were amplified algorithmically. Further,
our panel members certainly acquired information beyond
just retweets, and sought information directly from exter-
nal sources, some of which they may have linked to in their
own tweets. More broadly, Twitter is just one platform in
the larger information ecosystem, and it would be incredibly
valuable to understand how information crowdsourcing on
Twitter interacts with crowdsourcing on platforms like Face-
book, Reddit, YouTube (Marchal and Au 2020), Google, In-
stagram, WhatsApp, and TikTok, and with traditional broad-
cast media.
6 Conclusion
People will continue to need relevant, timely, and trusted in-
formation about COVID-19 in order to safeguard against the
disease and adapt to its social consequences. Our work be-
gins to map the information ecosystem that has emerged in
the wake of the pandemic, and identifies sustained COVID-
19 crowdsourced elites, those who have been widely and
consistently amplified around the pandemic. These elites
are focal points in online communication networks because
they have been given an authoritative platform with respect
to COVID-19, and their voices are more likely to resonate
with the audiences that crowdsourced them. By working
with COVID-19 elites to promote scientifically informed
best practices and guidelines, particularly among popula-
tions already devastated by the pandemic, and addressing
those that pollute the information ecosystem with dangerous
and divisive misinformation, we may be able to leverage the
natural crowdsourcing potential of social media to more eq-
uitably promote the publics health.
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